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Abstract
In this paper the Shapley value of digraph (directed graph) games are considered. Digraph
games are transferable utility (TU) games with limited cooperation among players, where play-
ers are represented by nodes. A restrictive relation between two adjacent players is established
by a directed line segment. Directed path, connecting the initial player with the terminal
player, form the coalition among players. A dominance relation is established between players
and this relation determines whether or not a player wants to cooperate. To cooperate, we
assume that a player joins a coalition where he/she is not dominated by any other players.
The Shapley value [1] is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding
to all permutations that do not violate the subordination of players. The Shapley value for
cyclic digraph games is calculated and analyzed. For a given family of characteristic functions,
a quick way to calculate Shapley values is formulated.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is the mathematical theory that studies the conflict and cooperation between
rational decision makers. Game theory helps to analyze decision making between two or more
individuals who influence one another’s welfare [2]. Cooperative game theory deals with coali-
tions and allocations, and considers group of players willing to allocate the joint benefits derived
from their cooperation [3].
When the players in a game form a coalition to work together, it is essential to identify the
correct way to distribute the profit among themselves. If some of the players in the coalition
are unsatisfied with the proposed allocation, then they are free to leave the coalition. In
stable coalitions there are fewer incentives to leave the coalition. The Shapley value provides
a unique way to divide a payoff among players in such a way as to satisfy various fairness
criteria. Distributing payoff to all players according to their Shapley value helps to create a
stable coalition. Myerson considers the cooperation between players in an undirected graph,
where each player has an equal chance to move away from a coalition by breaking the path
between them [4]. Such games assume fair and equal gain through cooperation.
This paper is motivated by the paper “The Shapley value for directed graph games” of
Anna Khmelnitskaya, Ozer Selcuk and Dolf Talman. They introduce the Shapley value for
digraph games and look for its stability [1].
As the structure of this paper, digraph games and the Shapley value are defined in section
2 and the following theorem is proved in section 3.
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Theorem 1.1. Consider f : Z≥0 → R with f(0) = 0. Suppose N = {1, ..., n} and define
vf : 2
N → R by vf (S) = f(|S|). Let Γ be the directed cycle (1, 2, ..., n, 1). Then the Shapley
value of the digraph game (vf ,Γ) is
Sh(vf ,Γ) =
(
f(n)
n
,
f(n)
n
,
f(n)
n
, · · · ,
f(n)
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
)
.
Finally in section 4, Shapley values of various directed cycle games are calculated.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite
set of players with n ≥ 2 and v : 2N → R. We interpret v(S) as the payoff that the coalition
S ⊆ N can generate. By convention, the payoff of an empty coalition is zero i.e. v(Ø) = 0.
We refer to the set of all TU-games with fixed set of players N as GN . For simplicity we use v
to refer to (N, v). For any player i ∈ N , player i’s minimum payoff which he can guarantee to
himself without joining any coalition is v({i}) .
A digraph is a tuple Γ = (N, τ ) where N is a finite set of players and τ is a set of directed
edges. A subgraph H of Γ is a digraph whose sets of players and directed edges are subsets of
N and τ , respectively. The restriction of a digraph Γ to a coalition S is denoted by Γ|S . A
directed path is a sequence (k1, k2, ..., km) of players such that the directed edge (k1, ki+1) is in
τ for all i. A directed cycle of players is a directed path with km = k1. A player j is successor
of player i if there exists a directed path from i ∈ N to j ∈ N in Γ. For i ∈ N , SΓ(i) denotes
the set of successors of i in Γ and S¯Γ(i) = SΓ(i) ∪ {i}. For digraph Γ and S ⊆ N , player i ∈ S
dominates player j ∈ S in Γ|S if j ∈ S
Γ|S (i) and i /∈ SΓ|S (j). When a player does not have
any predecessors, then he or she is undominated. No player is dominated on directed cycle.
A digraph game is a pair (v,Γ) of a TU-game v ∈ GN and a digraph Γ. A permutation
pi ∈ Π is consistent in Γ if it preserves the subordination of players determined by Γ, i.e.,
j ≻Γ|
P¯pi(i)
i implies pi(j) > pi(i) .
The marginal contribution of player i ∈ N to the coalitions in a game v ∈ GN is given by
mvi (S) = v(S ∪ i) − v(S). For any i ∈ N and permutation pi : N → N , pi(i) is the position of
player i in pi. A player i is a predecessor of player j in Γ if there exists a directed path from i
to j in Γ. The set of predecessors of i in pi is denoted Ppi(i) and P¯pi(i) = Ppi(i) ∪ {i}. For any
i ∈ N on a TU game, the marginal contribution vector m¯v(pi) ∈ RN is m¯vi (pi) = m
v
i (Ppi(i)) =
v(P¯pi(i))− v(Ppi(i)).
The Shapley value of a TU game is
Sh(v,Γ) =
∑
pi∈Π
m¯v(pi)
|ΠΓ|
,
where ΠΓ is the set of all permutations on N which are consistent with Γ. In the grand coalition
N , players divide v(S) among themselves. The outcome of this division depends on the power
structure in the grand coalition. The Shapley value provides a fair way to distribute v(N)
among themselves [3].
3 Results
Lemma 3.1. Suppose Γ is the cyclic digraph (1, 2, ..., n, 1). The only permutations which are
consistent with Γ are pik = (−1 + k,−2 + k, ..., 1 + k, k), where addition is modulo k, for each
k = 1, ..., n.
2
1 + kn
n
1
2
−1 + kn
kn
Figure 1: Γ
1 + kn
n
1
2
−1 + kn
Figure 2: Γ|P¯pi(kn−1)
Proof. Suppose pi = (k1, k2, ..., kn−1, kn) is consistent, so P¯pi(kn−1) = {k1, k2, ..., kn−1}. By
removing kn from Γ in Figure 1, Γ|P¯pi(kn−1) is the directed path (1 + kn, 2 + kn, ...,−1 + kn)
as shown in Figure 2. So 1 + kn ≻ 2 + kn ≻ ... ≻ −1 + kn. Thus by the definition of
consistency, pi(1 + kn) > pi(2 + kn) > ... > pi(−1 + kn). It follows that kn−1 = 1 + kn, kn−2 =
2 + kn, ...,−1 + kn = k1. Hence, pi = pikn
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let Γ be the directed cycle with a characteristic function vf (S) = f(|S|),
where S ⊆ N is a coalition of players. By Lemma 3.1, the number of players n is equal to the
number of permutations that are consistent with Γ. We know that for any player i, the ith
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component of the Shapley value is
Sh(vf ,Γ)i =
1
|ΠΓ|
∑
pi∈ΠΓ
m¯v(pi)
=
1
n
∑
pi∈ΠΓ
m¯v(pi)
=
1
n
∑
pi∈ΠΓ
(v(P¯pi(i))− v(Ppi(i)))
=
1
n
∑
pi∈ΠΓ
(v(Ppi(i)) ∪ v(i))− v(Ppi(i))).
We also know Ppi(i) = {j ∈ N |pi(j) < pi(i)}. For each k ∈ {1, ..., n}, there exists exactly one
permutation pi for which |P¯pi(i)| = k. Since vf (S) = f(|S|), the marginal contribution of player
i ∈ N is
∑
j=1n(f(j) − f(j − 1)).. This is equivalent to
∑n
j=1(f(j) − f(j − 1)). So,
Sh(vf ,Γ)i =
∑n
j=1 (f(j) − f(j − 1))
n
=
(f(n)− f(n− 1)) + (f(n− 1)− f(n− 2)) + ...+ (f(2− 1)− f(1− 1))
n
This is a telescoping sum i.e. each term in the numerator cancels except the initial and final
terms. Thus, Sh(Vf ,Γ)i =
f(n)− f(0)
n
=
f(n)
n
.
4 Examples
For any coalition S ⊆ N and k ∈ N, consider the characteristic function defined as vk(S) = |S|
k
on digraph Γ.
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Figure 3: Digraph Γ
Consider a cyclic digraph game (v,Γ) with three different players as shown in Figure
3. The set of all permutations that is consistent with Γ is {(1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3), (3, 2, 1)}. For
k = 0, Sh(v0,Γ) =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
. For k = 1, Sh(v1,Γ) = (1, 1, 1). For k = 2, Sh(v2,Γ) = (3, 3, 3).
For k = 3, Sh(v3,Γ) = (9, 9, 9). For k = 4, Sh(v4,Γ) = (27, 27, 27), and so on.
Again, consider a cyclic digraph game (v,Γ′) with four different players as shown in Figure 4.
The set of all permutations that is consistent with Γ′ is {(1, 4, 3, 2), (2, 1, 4, 3), (3, 2, 1, 4), (4, 3, 2, 1)}.
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Figure 4: Digraph Γ′
For k = 0, Sh(v0,Γ
′) =
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
. For k = 1, Sh(v1,Γ
′) = (1, 1, 1, 1). For k =
2, Sh(v2,Γ
′) = (4, 4, 4, 4). For k = 3, Sh(v3,Γ
′) = (16, 16, 16, 16). For k = 4, Sh(v4,Γ
′) =
(64, 64, 64, 64), and so on.
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Figure 5: Digraph Γ′′
As shown in Figure 5, consider a cyclic digraph game (v,Γ′′) with five different players. The
set of all permutations that is consistent with Γ′′ is {(1, 5, 4, 3, 2), (2, 1, 5, 4, 3), (3, 2, 1, 5, 4), (4, 3, 2, 1, 5),
(5, 4, 3, 2, 1)}. For k = 0, Sh(v0,Γ
′′) =
(
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
)
. For k = 1, Sh(v1,Γ
′′) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
For k = 2, Sh(v2,Γ
′′) = (5, 5, 5, 5, 5). For k = 3, Sh(v3,Γ
′′) = (25, 25, 25, 25, 25). For
k = 4, Sh(v4,Γ
′′) = (125, 125, 125, 125, 125), and so on.
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